Konferenzbeitrag

Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets, Bank Leverage Cycles and Macroeconomic Dynamics

I add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the overall economy to monetary policy and productivity shocks. It allows my model to match the volatility and correlation with output of the external finance premium, bank leverage, entrepreneurial leverage and other variables in US data better than a BGG-type model. A reasonably calibrated combination of balance sheet shocks produces a downturn of a magnitude similar to the "Great Recession".

Language
Deutsch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Banking and Macroeconomics ; No. B15-V1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Rannenberg, Ansgar
Event
Veröffentlichung
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Rannenberg, Ansgar

Time of origin

  • 2012

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