Arbeitspapier
Forward Contracting and the Welfare Effects of Mergers
I extend the oligopoly model of Allaz and Vila (1993) to explore how forward contracting affects the adverse welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. I derive a welfare statistic that, within the context of the model, is free of structural parameters. The statistic allows for conclusions that generalize across different cost and demand conditions. I then show that exogenous forward contracting mitigates welfare loss but that endogenous forward contracting exacerbates welfare loss provided the relevant industry is sufficiently concentrated.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 13-1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Miller, Nathan H.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
- (where)
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Washington, DC
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Miller, Nathan H.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
Time of origin
- 2013