Arbeitspapier

Forward Contracting and the Welfare Effects of Mergers

I extend the oligopoly model of Allaz and Vila (1993) to explore how forward contracting affects the adverse welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. I derive a welfare statistic that, within the context of the model, is free of structural parameters. The statistic allows for conclusions that generalize across different cost and demand conditions. I then show that exogenous forward contracting mitigates welfare loss but that endogenous forward contracting exacerbates welfare loss provided the relevant industry is sufficiently concentrated.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 13-1

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Miller, Nathan H.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
(where)
Washington, DC
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Miller, Nathan H.
  • U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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