Arbeitspapier

Contesting an International Trade Agreement

We develop a new theoretical framework of trade agreement (TA) formation, called a ‘parallel contest’, that emphasizes the political fight over TA ratification within countries. TA ratification is inherently uncertain in each country, where anti- and pro-trade interest groups contest each other to influence their own governments’ ratification decision. Unlike prior literature, the protection embodied in negotiated TA tariffs reflects a balance between the liberalizing force of lobbying and inherently protectionist government preferences. Moreover, new international political externalities emerge that are not internalized by governments that just internalize terms of trade externalities.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6956

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Economic Order and Integration
Thema
contests
international integration
trade agreement

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cole, Matthew T.
Lake, James
Zissimos, Benjamin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cole, Matthew T.
  • Lake, James
  • Zissimos, Benjamin
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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