Giving away the game? The impact of the disclosure effect on the patenting decision

Arbeitspapier

This article explores the propensity to patent in the light of the disclosure effect. Unlike earlier approaches concerned with the patenting decision, we take into account that a disclosure effect may decrease the merits of patenting by facilitating inventing around the patent for competitors. In our theoretical model, we find that the disclosure effect - contingent on the competitive environment of the inventor - possibly has substantial negative effects on the propensity to patent. An empirical investigation of the theoretical results finds support for the proposed effects.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 12-010

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing ; Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
• Subject: Patenting decision ; secrecy ; disclosure requirement ; patent breadth ; horizontal product differentiation ; circular city

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Heger, Diana ; Zaby, Alexandra K.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56016
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET