R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade

Arbeitspapier

We consider a dynamic three-stage game played by two regulator-firm hierarchies to capture the scale and technological effects of opening markets to international trade. Each firm produces one good sold on the market. Firms can invest in R&D in order to lower their fixed emission/output ratio and are regulated with costly public funds. We take the context of sufficiently high market sizes and investment cost parameters. Opening markets to international trade yields more investment in R&D, more production and a lower emission ratio. When the market size is low enough and the investment cost parameter is high enough, pollution in common market is higher than in autarky. International trade reduces the social welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 17.2004

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Thema: R&D ; Cleaner technology ; Common market ; Social welfare ; Umweltbelastung ; Umwelttechnik ; Industrieforschung ; Handelsliberalisierung ; Wohlfahrtsanalyse ; Zwei-Länder-Modell ; Theorie ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Youssef, Slim Ben
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117896
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ