Arbeitspapier

Do Parents Tax Their Children? Teenage Labour Supply and Financial Support

This paper models child employment and parental pocket money decisions as a non-cooperative game. Assuming that the child human capital is a household public good and that the relationship between child human capital and employment is concave, we compare the welfare obtained under different decision-making mechanisms and test the predictions of the model for a cohort of English teenagers in compulsory education. Our results support a situation in which parents 'tax' their children's earnings, withdrawing financial support as the child increases his working hours. This strategy forces the child to internalise the social cost of his activities.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10040

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
Noncooperative Games
Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Thema
intra-household transfers
pocket money
child labour supply
noncooperative game
human capital

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holford, Angus J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holford, Angus J.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2016

Ähnliche Objekte (12)