Artikel

Trading and Shareholder Democracy

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: The Journal of Finance ; ISSN: 1540-6261 ; Volume: 79 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 257-304 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Levit, Doron
Malenko, Nadya
Maug, Ernst
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.1111/jofi.13289
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Levit, Doron
  • Malenko, Nadya
  • Maug, Ernst
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2023

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