Designing Dynamic Research Tournaments

Konferenzbeitrag

This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research tournaments when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal tournament and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In particular, the optimal tournament attains the first-best. More generally, we show that global stopping rules can be implemented robustly and compare them to individual stopping rules which have been analyzed in the existing literature. We conclude by discussing policy implications of our findings and highlight that global stopping rules combine the best aspects of innovation races and fixed prize tournaments.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Competition and Tournaments ; No. C04-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Other

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Letina, Igor ; Benkert, Jean-Michel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145738
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET