Regulatory Chill and the Effect of Investor State Dispute Settlements

Konferenzbeitrag

Legal conflicts between multinational firms and host governments are often decided by international arbitration panels known as Investor State Dispute Settlements (ISDS). Critics fear that ISDS favors multinational firms, and make s governments reluctant to adopt appropriate policies (regulatory chill). I develop an economic model to analyze regulatory chill and show under which conditions a move to ISDS is beneficial.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Foreign Direct Investment I ; No. B14-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Janeba, Eckhard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168255
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET