Arbeitspapier
Taxes and the location of production
In this paper I examine dynamic tax competition in the context of an endogenous market structure. I therefore consider the tensions between proximity versus concentration, taxation and firm mobility while I also consider strategic interaction by governments (to induce multinationality) and asymmetric firms (for market share). The paper explores how strategic tax setting by rival governments may induce footloose firms to remain committed to initial location decisions, even when faced with adverse taxation regimes. In this instance, sunk costs resulting from the operation of additional plants may confer a first mover advantage on governments that can prevent relocation of firms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP03/12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Steuerwettbewerb
Betriebliche Standortwahl
Unvollkommener Wettbewerb
Theorie
Wiederholte Spiele
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Porter, Lynda
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University College Dublin, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Dublin
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Porter, Lynda
- University College Dublin, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2003