Arbeitspapier

Tax planning of R&D intensive multinationals

The allocation of management and control in the business decision process finds expression in the coordination intensity between agents in the firm. We develop and test a theory, based on the organizational design literature, for the intensity in which the tax department strives to coordinate with managers from other business units in order to intervene in investment decisions. Our theoretical considerations predict that R&D intensity is an important determinant of the tax department's role. Using data from a confidential survey taken in 2012 of top financial and tax managers of very large multinational companies, representing 8% of business R&D spending in the OECD, we indeed find supporting evidence that in R&D intensive multinational firms the tax department operates more as a controller than as a manager. In particular, tax departments of R&D intensive firms make less tax planning effort, are less ambitious to minimize the tax burden of the firm, are later involved in the decision-making process of a new investment project, but are more likely to have a veto right in the decision on a new investment project as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Conditional on R&D intensity, however, the level of intangible assets in the firm is associated with more tax planning efforts and ambitions. Our results are statistically significant and robust towards several sensitivity checks.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 14-114

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Accounting
Subject
corporate taxation
organizational design
survey data

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Heckemeyer, Jost H.
Richter, Katharina
Spengel, Christoph
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2014

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-374624
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Heckemeyer, Jost H.
  • Richter, Katharina
  • Spengel, Christoph
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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