Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income, and welfare spending

Arbeitspapier

No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we find that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3613

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
• Subject: redistribution ; welfare spending ; information ; income ; voting ; political economics

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lind, Jo Thori ; Rohner, Dominic
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52497
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET