Job Promotion Tournaments and Imperfect Recall

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, a promotion tournament is considered, where, at the beginning of the tournament, it is unknown how long the tournament lasts. Further, the promotion decision is based on the assessments of a supervisor with imperfect recall. In line with psychological research, the supervisor is assumed to either value early or recent impressions more strongly. It is shown that effort may increase or decrease, as the probability of promotion in a certain period gets higher. The single effects determining the sign of the effort change oftentimes depend on how the supervisor processes information.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 112

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Thema: Promotion Tournament ; Promotion Probability ; Imperfect Recall

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gürtler, Oliver
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13439
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94121
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13439-1
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ