Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion
We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies (NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a dynamic model which supports the refinements.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005:37
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
-
Evolutionary dynamics
Neutrally stable strategies
ascending NSS
Eroding NSS.
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Torstensson, Pär
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Lund
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Torstensson, Pär
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2005