Arbeitspapier

Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion

We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies (NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a dynamic model which supports the refinements.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005:37

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
Evolutionary dynamics
Neutrally stable strategies
ascending NSS
Eroding NSS.

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Torstensson, Pär
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(where)
Lund
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Torstensson, Pär
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2005

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