Arbeitspapier

Does CFPB oversight crimp credit?

We study the effects of regulatory oversight by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on credit supply as well as bank risk-taking, growth, and operating costs. We use a difference-in-differences approach, making use of the fact that banks below a $10 billion size cutoff are exempt from CFPB supervision and enforcement activities. We find little evidence that CFPB oversight significantly reduces the overall volume of mortgage lending. However, we find some evidence of changes in the composition of lending-CFPB-supervised banks originated fewer loans to risky borrowers, offset by an increase in large "jumbo" mortgages. We find no clear evidence of substitution in lending between bank and nonbank subsidiaries, or effects on asset growth or bank noninterest expenses.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Staff Report ; No. 857

Classification
Wirtschaft
Consumer Protection
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
consumer financial protection bureau
credit
mortgage
regulation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fuster, Andreas
Plosser, Matthew
Vickery, James
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fuster, Andreas
  • Plosser, Matthew
  • Vickery, James
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Time of origin

  • 2018

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