Decentralized Task Coordination

Arbeitspapier

We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFRO Working Paper ; No. 2020/11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Market Design ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Thema: Decentralized mechanisms ; Implementation ; Bargaining ; Consistency ; Blockchain

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gudmundsson, Jens ; Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Platz, Trine Tornøe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO)
• (wo): Copenhagen
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/225512
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ