Decentralized Task Coordination

Arbeitspapier

We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFRO Working Paper ; No. 2020/11

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Market Design ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: Decentralized mechanisms ; Implementation ; Bargaining ; Consistency ; Blockchain

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gudmundsson, Jens ; Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Platz, Trine Tornøe
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO)
• (where): Copenhagen
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/225512
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET