Arbeitspapier

Why do capital intensive companies pay higher wages?

An obvious answer to this question is the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis originally proposed by Zwi Griliches (1969). But the relatively poor performance of this hypothesis suggests that other explanations are needed. Here we consider the labour union behaviour in the wage bargaining process as such an alternative. The explanation is based on the observation that capital intensive companies are more vulnerable to strike threats and may thus more easily give in for union wage demand. Thus, the bargaining power of unions is related to the capital-labour ratio. This paper provides some tests for these hypotheses with panel data for Finnish companies. The results give support to the wage bargaining hypothesis.

ISBN
952-462-199-1
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 5/2005

Classification
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Subject
wages
bargaining
wage distribution
panel data

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Virén, Matti
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Finland
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Virén, Matti
  • Bank of Finland

Time of origin

  • 2005

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