Konferenzbeitrag
Taxing Pollutuion: Agglomeration and Welfare Consequences
This paper demonstrates that a pollution tax with a fixed cost component may lead, by itself, to segregation between clean and dirty firms without heterogeneous preferences or increasing returns. We construct a simple model with two locations and two industries (clean and dirty) where pollution is a by-product of dirty good manufacturing. Under proper assumptions, a completely stratified configuration with all dirty firms clustering in one city emerges as the only equilibrium outcome when there is a fixed cost component of the pollution tax. Moreover, a stratified Pareto optimum can never be supported by a competitive spatial equilibrium with a linear pollution tax. To support such a stratified Pareto optimum, however, an effective but unconventional policy pre-scription is to redistribute the pollution tax revenue from the dirty to the clean city residents.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: 52nd Congress of the European Regional Science Association: "Regions in Motion - Breaking the Path", 21-25 August 2012, Bratislava, Slovakia
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Externalities
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
- Thema
-
Pollution Tax
Agglomeration of Polluting Producers
Endogenous Stratification
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Berliant, Marcus
Peng, Shin-Kun
Wang, Ping
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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European Regional Science Association (ERSA)
- (wo)
-
Louvain-la-Neuve
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Berliant, Marcus
- Peng, Shin-Kun
- Wang, Ping
- European Regional Science Association (ERSA)
Entstanden
- 2012