Arbeitspapier
International emissions trading in a non-cooperative equilibrium
Linkage of different countries' domestic permit markets for pollution rights into a single international market alters governments' incentives, and may trigger adjustments of the number of allocated permits. First, this work finds that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, international emissions trading is likely to increase the total emissions. Second, although trading will give a more efficient cross-country allocation of emissions, efficiency may nevertheless fall, because an already inefficiently low abatement level is likely to be further reduced. Third, we find that large countries are likely to experience losses from linking their permit markets to the permit markets of smaller countries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 542
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
-
Emissions trading
efficiency
non-cooperative games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Holtsmark, Bjart J.
Sommervoll, Dag Einar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Statistics Norway, Research Department
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Holtsmark, Bjart J.
- Sommervoll, Dag Einar
- Statistics Norway, Research Department
Entstanden
- 2008
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The State As a Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game
Non-cooperative game theory
Non-cooperative planning theory
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Consumption Taxes in the Presence of Cross-Border Pollution
Retirement in non-cooperative and cooperative families
Transfrontier Pollution: Cooperative and NonCooperative Solutions
Retirement in Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Families
Quantifying Non-cooperative Climate Engineering
Non-cooperative games with many players
Preplay Negotiations in Non-Cooperative Games
The Ramsey cooperative and non-cooperative unconventional monetary policy
The State As a Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game
Non-cooperative game theory
Non-cooperative planning theory
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Consumption Taxes in the Presence of Cross-Border Pollution
Retirement in non-cooperative and cooperative families
Transfrontier Pollution: Cooperative and NonCooperative Solutions
Retirement in Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Families
Quantifying Non-cooperative Climate Engineering
Non-cooperative games with many players
Preplay Negotiations in Non-Cooperative Games
The Ramsey cooperative and non-cooperative unconventional monetary policy
The State As a Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game
Non-cooperative game theory
Non-cooperative planning theory
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Consumption Taxes in the Presence of Cross-Border Pollution
Retirement in non-cooperative and cooperative families
Transfrontier Pollution: Cooperative and NonCooperative Solutions
Retirement in Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Families
Quantifying Non-cooperative Climate Engineering
Non-cooperative games with many players
Preplay Negotiations in Non-Cooperative Games