Arbeitspapier

Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market with Sequential and Simultaneous Insurance Demand

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, we assume that for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided either sequentially or simultaneously. We show that different risk-groups prefer different types of contracts, and that only the sequential contracts, which are favourable for the long-living individuals, represent an equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 783

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
annuity markets
adverse selection
uncertain lifetimes
equilibrium

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Brunner, Johann K.
Pech, Susanne
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Brunner, Johann K.
  • Pech, Susanne
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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