Arbeitspapier

Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market with Sequential and Simultaneous Insurance Demand

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, we assume that for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided either sequentially or simultaneously. We show that different risk-groups prefer different types of contracts, and that only the sequential contracts, which are favourable for the long-living individuals, represent an equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 783

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
annuity markets
adverse selection
uncertain lifetimes
equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brunner, Johann K.
Pech, Susanne
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brunner, Johann K.
  • Pech, Susanne
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2002

Ähnliche Objekte (12)