Arbeitspapier
Computation of the Nucleolus for a Class of Disjunctive Games with a Permission Structure
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a situation in which players in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. The corresponding restricted game takes account of the limited cooperation possibilities by assigning to every coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset. In this paper we provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with permission structure.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-060/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
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TU-game
nucleolus
game with permission structure
peer group game
information market game
algorithm
complexity
Transferable Utility Games
Core
Kooperatives Spiel
Informationsmarkt
Soziale Beziehungen
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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van den Brink, René
Katsev, Ilya
van der Laan, Gerard
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- van den Brink, René
- Katsev, Ilya
- van der Laan, Gerard
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2008
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Axiomatizations of Permission Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure using Split Neutrality
Efficient Computation of Equilibria in Bottleneck Games via Game Transformation
Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games
The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree
The locally partial permission value for games with a permission structure
A Class of Solvable Stopping Games
Computation of sparse and dense equilibrium strategies of evolutionary games
Computation of the nucleolus for superadditive 4-person-games
A Class of Best-Response Potential Games
Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation
Silverman's game : a special class of two-person Zero-Sum games
Equilibrium computation in resource allocation games
Axiomatizations of Permission Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure using Split Neutrality
Efficient Computation of Equilibria in Bottleneck Games via Game Transformation
Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games
The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree
The locally partial permission value for games with a permission structure
A Class of Solvable Stopping Games
Computation of sparse and dense equilibrium strategies of evolutionary games
Computation of the nucleolus for superadditive 4-person-games
A Class of Best-Response Potential Games
Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation
Silverman's game : a special class of two-person Zero-Sum games