Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

Artikel

We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains in private values and quasi-linear utility setting. In such multidimensional domains, an agent’s type is characterized by a single number, the value of the agent, and a non-empty set of acceptable alternatives. Each acceptable alternative gives the agent utility equal to his value and other alternatives give him zero utility. We identity a new condition, which we call generation monotonicity, that is necessary and sufficient for implementability in any dichotomous domain. If such a domain satisfies a richness condition, then a weaker version of generation monotonicity, which we call 2-generation monotonicity (equivalent to 3-cycle monotonicity), is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We use this result to derive the optimal mechanism in a one-sided matching problem with agents having dichotomous types.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 431-466 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Auctions
• Subject: Dominant strategy implementation ; cycle monotonicity ; dichotomous preferences ; generation monotonicity

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mishra, Debasis ; Roy, Souvik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE1239
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150197
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET