Government fiscal efforts vs. labour union strikes. Strategic substitutes or complements?

Arbeitspapier

To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1013

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Fiscal Policy ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Noncooperative Games ; Quantitative Policy Modeling ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Castellani, Massimiliano ; Fanelli, Luca ; Savioli, Marco
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (wo): Bologna
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4285
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159851
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ