Government fiscal efforts vs. labour union strikes. Strategic substitutes or complements?

Arbeitspapier

To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1013

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Fiscal Policy ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Noncooperative Games ; Quantitative Policy Modeling ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Castellani, Massimiliano ; Fanelli, Luca ; Savioli, Marco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (where): Bologna
• (when): 2015

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4285
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159851
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET