Arbeitspapier

International Trade and Stable Resolutions of Resource Disputes

We consider a dynamic setting in which two sovereign states with overlapping ownership claims on a resource/asset first arm and then choose whether to resolve their dispute violently through war or peacefully through settlement. Both approaches depend on the states' military capacities, but have very different outcomes. War precludes the possibility of international trade and can be destructive; however, once a winner is declared, arming is unnecessary in future periods. By contrast, a peaceful resolution avoids destruction and supports mutually advantageous trade; yet, settlements must be renegotiated in the shadow of arming and the threat of war. In this setting, we characterize the conditions under which peace arises as a stable equilibrium over time. We find that, depending on the destructiveness of war, time preferences, and the initial distribution of resource endowments, greater gains from trade can reduce arming and pacify international tensions. Even when the gains from trade are relatively small, peace might be sustainable, but only for more uneven endowment distributions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10040

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Distribution: General
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Trade: General
International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
Economic Impacts of Globalization: General
Thema
interstate war
armed peace
unarmed peace
security policies
gains from trade
shadow of the future

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Garfinkel, Michelle R.
Syropoulos, Constantinos
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Garfinkel, Michelle R.
  • Syropoulos, Constantinos
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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