Umbrella branding and external certification

Arbeitspapier

In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize equilibria in which umbrella branding fully or partially substitutes for external certification. We also show that the potential to signal quality is improved if consumers condition their beliefs on the source of information, namely whether information comes from external certification or from random detection.

Objekt anzeigen

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2008,10

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Management ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Advertising ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Umbrella branding ; certification ; signalling ; Markenpolitik ; Produktqualität ; Warenkennzeichnung ; Signalling ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hakenes, Hendrik ; Peitz, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26947