Arbeitspapier

An evolutionary explanation for the propensity to migrate

We explore the evolutionary dynamics of a population that consists of cooperators and defectors, wherein each member of the many pairs of players of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game is drawn at random, and the number of descendents positively depends on the payoffs in the game. We demonstrate how an inclination to migrate may be mapped onto the overall evolutionary fitness of the cooperators. The threshold value of the inclination to migrate parameter is obtained. Intensities of migration higher than that value guarantee that in the long run, the population will consist entirely of cooperators. The threshold value is characterized by the payoff parameters lying at the base of the evolutionary dynamics.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CORE Discussion Paper ; No. 2005/38

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics
Thema
Haystacks-type model
Prisoner's dilemma game
Inclination to migrate
Evolution of cooperation
Taste for migration

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Savvateev, Alexei
Stark, Oded
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Université Catholique de Louvain
(wo)
Louvain-la-Neuve
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Savvateev, Alexei
  • Stark, Oded
  • Université Catholique de Louvain

Entstanden

  • 2005

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