Arbeitspapier

Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance

Children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market. Moreover, parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non-credible. To promote work effort, parents may want to instill norms which later cause their children to experience guilt or shame associated with failure to support themselves. While social insurance pools risk across families, we show that it also creates a free-rider problem among parents in terms of norm formation. We also examine the formation of norms requiring children to support their parents financially in old age.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 557

Classification
Wirtschaft
Household Behavior and Family Economics: Other
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
Subject
Work norms
Social insurance
Altruism
Altruismus
Familiensoziologie
Arbeitsethik
Sozialversicherung
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lindbeck, Assar
Nyberg, Sten
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lindbeck, Assar
  • Nyberg, Sten
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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