Arbeitspapier

The Euro Area's Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening

The Single Supervisory Mechanism was introduced to eliminate the common-pool problem and limit uncontrolled lending by national central banks (NCBs). We analyze its effectiveness. Second, we model how, by forbearing and providing refinancing credit, NCBs avoid domestic resolution costs and, instead, share potential losses within the Euro Area. This results in “evergreening” of bad loans. Third, we construct a new evergreening index based on a large worldwide survey administered by the ifo institute. Regressions show evergreening is significantly greater in the Euro Area and where banks are in distress. Finally, greater evergreening accompanies higher growth of NCB-credit and Target2-liabilities.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6670

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Institutional Arrangements
Central Banks and Their Policies
Subject
single supervisory mechanism
evergreening
nonperforming loans
common-pool problem

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Steinkamp, Sven
Tornell, Aaron
Westermann, Frank
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Steinkamp, Sven
  • Tornell, Aaron
  • Westermann, Frank
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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