One-dimensional mechanism design

Artikel

We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black 1948, Dummett and Farquharson 1961) and the division of a nondisposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule (Sprumont 1991). We construct a canonical peak-only rule that equalizes, in the leximin sense, individual gains from an arbitrary benchmark allocation: it is efficient, group-strategyproof, fair, and (for most problems) continuous. These properties leave room for many other rules, except for symmetric nondisposable division problems.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 587-619 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Single-peaked preferences ; strategyproof mechanisms ; leximin ordering ; voting ; rationing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Moulin, Hervé
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2017

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2307
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197199
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET