Arbeitspapier

Policy coordination in an international payment system

Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators. In this paper I show that two central banks operating in a non-cooperative way will not have an incentive to achieve the optimal allocation of goods. I further show that this non-cooperative outcome will be supported by a zero intraday interest rate and constant fixed exchange rate. This is in contrast to recent research; which has shown that domestically a zero intraday interest rate will achieve a social optimum and that the central bank has an incentive to achieve it.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2008-17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Exchange rate regimes

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chapman, James T. E.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2008

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2008-17
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chapman, James T. E.
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2008

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