Arbeitspapier
Policy coordination in an international payment system
Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators. In this paper I show that two central banks operating in a non-cooperative way will not have an incentive to achieve the optimal allocation of goods. I further show that this non-cooperative outcome will be supported by a zero intraday interest rate and constant fixed exchange rate. This is in contrast to recent research; which has shown that domestically a zero intraday interest rate will achieve a social optimum and that the central bank has an incentive to achieve it.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2008-17
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Exchange rate regimes
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Chapman, James T. E.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bank of Canada
- (wo)
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Ottawa
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
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doi:10.34989/swp-2008-17
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chapman, James T. E.
- Bank of Canada
Entstanden
- 2008