Arbeitspapier

Policy coordination in an international payment system

Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators. In this paper I show that two central banks operating in a non-cooperative way will not have an incentive to achieve the optimal allocation of goods. I further show that this non-cooperative outcome will be supported by a zero intraday interest rate and constant fixed exchange rate. This is in contrast to recent research; which has shown that domestically a zero intraday interest rate will achieve a social optimum and that the central bank has an incentive to achieve it.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2008-17

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Exchange rate regimes

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chapman, James T. E.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2008

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2008-17
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chapman, James T. E.
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2008

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