Arbeitspapier

Robustly optimal monetary policy with near-rational expectations

The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely modelconsistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more historydependent than if rational expectations are assumed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2007/12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Thema
Optimal Monetary Policy
Commitment
History-Dependent Policy
Geldpolitik
Konjunkturpolitik
Rationale Erwartung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Woodford, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2005

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-38229
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Woodford, Michael
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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