Arbeitspapier

The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods

A large share of public funds is spent on private goods (education, health care, day care, etc.). This paper integrates two different approaches to the analysis of public provision of private goods. While normative public economics has established an efficiency case for such provision, the commonly held political economy view has been that it is an economically inefficient phenomenon generated by the political process. The present paper argues that the central mechanism studied in the normative approach is equally relevant to voting models of decisions on public provision. It is shown that under plausible information constraints economically efficient public provision of private goods will be part of politically rational decisions emerging from a median voter process or a representative democracy of political parties.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998:14

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Subject
political economy
public provision
private goods
in-kind transfers

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Blomquist, Sören
Christiansen, Vidar
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(where)
Uppsala
(when)
1998

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2421
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Blomquist, Sören
  • Christiansen, Vidar
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1998

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