Arbeitspapier

Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs

This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors' choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a delegation-scheme. Conversely, project aid represents a more centralized type of aid. According to the theory, when countries' local knowledge is more important than donors' information, recipient countries' discretion in the choice of policies should be increased (delegation). Conversely, there should be less freedom in designing policies when donors' information is more relevant (centralization). The empirical analysis confirms that the importance of donors' private information influences the amount of project aid, while recipients' local knowledge is positively correlated with the amount of budget support.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4437

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Economic Development: General
Thema
delegation
communication
ownership
foreign aid

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dreher, Axel
Marchesi, Silvia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dreher, Axel
  • Marchesi, Silvia
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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