Autocracy and the public: Mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships

Arbeitspapier

Threats of mass revolts could effectively constrain a dictator's public policy if it were not for the collective-action problem. Mass revolts nevertheless happen, but they follow a stochastic pattern. We describe this pattern in a threshold model of collective action and integrate it into an agency model which demonstrates how mass revolts can impact on a winning coalition's incentives to keep backing an incumbent dictator. Having observed public policy and found a sufficiently high posterior probability of the dictator to be of a "bad" character, the winning coalition's members may exploit an incidentally happening mass revolt for escaping a loyalty trap that had otherwise prevented them from switching to disloyalty. While this explains why mass revolts sometimes happen to oust a dictator, the arising policy constraints in dictatorships may nevertheless be weak in practice.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CIW Discussion Paper ; No. 5/2015

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Autocracy ; Revolutions ; Threshold Models ; Selectorate Theory

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Apolte, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung (CIW)
• (where): Münster
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120896
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET