Arbeitspapier

The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Public Investment if Budget Deficits are Politically Motivated

Uncertainty about the future preferences of the government may induce policy makers to run excessive budget deficits. As a solution to this problem, economists have proposed to impose a binding debt rule. In this paper we argue that a binding debt rule does not eliminate the distortions due to strategic behaviour of politicians. Rather, strategic manipulation shifts from public debt to public investment. As an alternative, we examine the effects of a capital borrowing rule which permits the government to run a budget deficit equal to the amount of public investment. We show that this rule effectively eliminates strategic behaviour.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 97-125/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Fiscal Policy
National Budget; Budget Systems
National Deficit; Surplus
Thema
fiscal rules
budget deficits
public investment
Öffentliche Investition
Haushaltsdefizit
Finanzpolitik
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dur, Robert A.J.
Peletier, Ben D.
Swank, Otto H.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
1997

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dur, Robert A.J.
  • Peletier, Ben D.
  • Swank, Otto H.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 1997

Ähnliche Objekte (12)