Aging and immigration policy in a representative democracy

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes how population aging affects immigration policy in rich industrialized countries. It sets up a two-period model of a representative democracy with two overlapping generations. The government's preferred immigration rate increases with the share of retirees in the population. The paper differentiates between an economy without a pension system and one with pay-as-you-go pensions. As immigrants have more children than natives, the chosen immigration rate is contingent on the design of the pension system. If pension contributions and benefits are set freely by the government, equilibrium immigration is lower than it is in the absence of a pension system. On the contrary, it is higher if the pension level is fixed ex ante to a relatively generous level, since native workers then benefit from sharing the burden of pension contributions with the immigrants.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 18-2010

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; International Migration
• Thema: demographic change ; political economy ; immigration policy ; Migrationspolitik ; Demokratie ; Alternde Bevölkerung ; Public Choice ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Calahorrano, Lena
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
• (wo): Marburg
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56509
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ