Strategic Housing Policy, Migration and Sorting around Population Thresholds

Arbeitspapier

We analyse whether, when and how local office-holders respond to the personal, economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and/or remuneration of local office-holders. Using data from all 589 Belgian municipalities over the period 1977-2014, local politicians are found to purposefully influence population growth through policy measures aimed at stimulating net in-migration when approaching important population thresholds. We provide evidence that strategic housing policy decisions – i.e. granting additional building permits early in the election cycle to maximize population growth just before the ‘deadline’ to surpass a population threshold – act as a key mechanism.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5639

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General ; Demographic Economics: Public Policy ; Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics ; Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy
• Subject: rent-seeking ; political agency ; regression discontinuity designs ; building permits

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Witte, Kristof De ; Geys, Benny
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128334
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET