Arbeitspapier
Banks' risk-taking within a banking union
We study the relationship between banks' size and risk-taking in the context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on banking unions and in contrast to analyses emphasising incentives under- pinned by the too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse relationship between banks' size and non-performing loan growth for a sample of European banks. Evidence is provided that the mechanism operates through the enhanced organisational efficiency of the supranational set-up rather than incentives alignment among the supervisors and the banks.
- ISBN
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978-92-899-4818-0
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2595
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: General
- Subject
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Supervision
euro area
non-performing loans
banking union
too-big-to-fail
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Farnè, Matteo
Vouldis, Angelos
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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European Central Bank (ECB)
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.2866/85240
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Farnè, Matteo
- Vouldis, Angelos
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Time of origin
- 2021