Banks' risk-taking within a banking union

Arbeitspapier

We study the relationship between banks' size and risk-taking in the context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on banking unions and in contrast to analyses emphasising incentives under- pinned by the too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse relationship between banks' size and non-performing loan growth for a sample of European banks. Evidence is provided that the mechanism operates through the enhanced organisational efficiency of the supranational set-up rather than incentives alignment among the supervisors and the banks.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-92-899-4818-0
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2595

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: General
• Thema: Supervision ; euro area ; non-performing loans ; banking union ; too-big-to-fail

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Farnè, Matteo ; Vouldis, Angelos
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): European Central Bank (ECB)
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.2866/85240
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/246172
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ