Arbeitspapier
Banks' risk-taking within a banking union
We study the relationship between banks' size and risk-taking in the context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on banking unions and in contrast to analyses emphasising incentives under- pinned by the too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse relationship between banks' size and non-performing loan growth for a sample of European banks. Evidence is provided that the mechanism operates through the enhanced organisational efficiency of the supranational set-up rather than incentives alignment among the supervisors and the banks.
- ISBN
-
978-92-899-4818-0
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2595
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: General
- Thema
-
Supervision
euro area
non-performing loans
banking union
too-big-to-fail
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Farnè, Matteo
Vouldis, Angelos
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European Central Bank (ECB)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2021
- DOI
-
doi:10.2866/85240
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Farnè, Matteo
- Vouldis, Angelos
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2021