Arbeitspapier
Dynamic tax externalities and the U.S. fiscal transformation in the 1930s
We propose a theory of tax centralization in politico-economic equilibrium. Taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are rationally internalized at the federal, but not at the regional level. The political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government. Complementarities on the spending side decouple the equilibrium composition of spending and taxation and create a role for inter governmental grants. The model provides an explanation for the centralization of revenue, introduction of grants, and expansion of federal income taxation in the U.S. around the time of the New Deal. Quantitatively, it accounts for between 30% and 100% of the federal revenue share's doubling in the 1930s, and for the long-term increase in federal grants.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 18-03
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Fiscal Policy
Public Goods
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
Fiscal policy
Federalism
Politico-economic equilibrium
Markov equilibrium
Public goods
Grants
Political Economy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Niepelt, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bern, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Bern
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft.
Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Niepelt, Dirk
- University of Bern, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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