Arbeitspapier

Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data

Citizens are willing to abandon their short-term financial interest in free-riding considerably, if governments act in their interest, if procedures of the public decisions-making process are felt to be fair and if other fellow-citizens have to contribute also an adequate share to the community. In such a situation trustworthiness of a government and trust in a government is high. This paper provides empirical evidence that trust is crucial for fiscal performance using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 1981-2001 period. In cantons with high levels of trust, the level of indebtedness is significantly lower. Trust supports fiscal discipline. In order to get a useful approximation for mutual trust among citizens and between citizens and their representatives, we use information from direct voter participation on political issues (initiatives and public referenda) held in Swiss state (cantonal) governments. Electoral support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of trust in a real world setting. Hence, our trust variable measures the behavior at the ballots thereby reducing possible subjective biases derived from surveys and questionnaires.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 61.2005

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Fiscal Policy
Thema
Trust
Social capital
Fiscal performance
Indebtedness
Vertrauen
Social Capital
Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft
Good Governance
Schweiz

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Torgler, Benno
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Torgler, Benno
  • Schaltegger, Christoph A.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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