The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs

Arbeitspapier

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form differenc-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-053-6
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 54

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
• Thema: multi-unit auctions ; procurement auctions ; Öffentliche Beschaffung ; Auktionstheorie ; Zeit ; Extensives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): De Silva, Dakshina G. ; Kosmopoulou, Georgia ; Pagel, Beatrice ; Peeters, Ronald
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59002
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ