Arbeitspapier

Enfranchising the crowd: Nominee account equity crowdfunding

The nominee approach to equity crowdfunding pools all crowd investors into one (nominee) account where typically the platform acts as the legal owner but the crowd retains beneficial ownership. The platform plays an active digital corporate governance role that simultaneously enfranchises crowd investors with voting and ownership rights but removes the administrative burden on startups of having to deal with several hundred shareholders. Through an inter-platform and intra-platform analysis of a large sample of 1,018 initial equity crowdfunding campaigns, this paper assesses both the short-term and the long-term impact of nominee versus direct ownership. It finds that nominee initial campaigns are on average more successful than direct ownership campaigns in that they are more likely to succeed, raise more funds, attract overfunding and enjoy greater long run success in terms of successful seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings, numbers of such offerings, and probability of survival. These results hold inter-platform between the two main UK equity crowdfunding platforms (Seedrs and Crowdcube) as well as intra-platform, using the post-2015 quasi-natural experiment when the nominee approach became an option for startups raising capital on Crowdcube.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 664

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
New Firms; Startups
Thema
Entrepreneurial finance
corporate governance
nominee account

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Coakley, Jerry
Cumming, Douglas J.
Lazos, Aristogenis
Vismara, Silvio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Coakley, Jerry
  • Cumming, Douglas J.
  • Lazos, Aristogenis
  • Vismara, Silvio
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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