Artikel

Schelling, von Neumann, and the event that didn't occur

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann's prediction, and the 'event that didn't occur' formed the subject of Schelling's Nobel lecture. The answer to the question 'why?' is the central concern of this paper.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 53-89 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
game theory
deterrence
nuclear strategy
Schelling
von Neumann

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Field, Alexander J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2014

DOI
doi:10.3390/g5010053
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Field, Alexander J.
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2014

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