Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions

Arbeitspapier

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instrument to reward aggressive bidding and enhance expected revenue. A fixed supply may not be optimal even when accounting for the cost to the seller of issuing a quantity different from her target supply.

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• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1495

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Central Banks and Their Policies
• Thema: uniform-price auction ; divisible good ; strategic role of the seller ; endogenous supply ; Treasury and IPO auctions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): LiCalzi, Marco ; Pavan, Alessandro
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59625