Arbeitspapier

Monetary policy and nominal rigidities under low inflation

In most European countries, nominal wages are given in collective agreements or individual employment contracts, and the employer cannot unilaterally cut wages, even after the expiration of a collective agreement. Ceteris paribus, workers have a stronger bargaining position when they try to prevent a cut in nominal wages. If inflation is so low that some nominal wages have to be cut, worker’s stronger bargaining position requires higher unemployment in equilibrium. The upshot is a long run trade off between inflation and unemployment for low levels of inflation. The prediction that low inflation involves higher unemployment in Europe but not in the US is consistent with previous empirical findings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2001,16

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Monetary Policy
Labor Law
Thema
Nominal wage rigidity
labour contracts
monetary policy
inflation
equilibrium unemployment
Lohnrigidität
Tarifpolitik
Inflation
Preisniveaustabilität
Geldpolitik
Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holden, Steinar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holden, Steinar
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2001

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