Infrastructure upgrades and foreclosure with coexistence of service-based and facility-based firms

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding servicebased firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure upgrades made by a regulated facility-based firm on service-based firms play a key role in the incentives for making these upgrades. The spillover effect can enhance the incentives for the regulated facility-based firm to make upgrades if access prices are not regulated. The existence of rival facility-based firms strengthens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to make infrastructure upgrades, especially when the spillover effect is significant. Furthermore, if access prices are not regulated, the existence of rival facility-based firms weakens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to foreclose service-based firms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 860

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation ; Economics of Regulation ; Telecommunications
• Subject: investment ; access ; service-based firm ; facility-based firm ; Investition ; Telekommunikationsnetz ; Markteintritt ; Monopol ; Regulierungstheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Matsushima, Noriaki ; Mizuno, Keizo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92764
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET