Arbeitspapier

Income effects and trade agreements

This paper considers trade agreements in a sufficiently general framework to encompass both imperfectly competitive market structures and income effects in government objectives. We show that governments choose globally efficient policies if they act as if they do not value the impact of their policies on their terms of trade. The results confirm that additional international externalities that arise in imperfectly competitive settings are the result of government failure to equate markups between sectors with domestic policies, not demandside factors.

ISBN
978-615-5594-52-6
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2016/16

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Economic Integration
Thema
trade agreements
income effects
non-homothetic preferences

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
DeRemer, David R.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • DeRemer, David R.
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2016

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