Artikel
Institutional directors and board compensation: Spanish evidence
We address the influence of directors who represent institutional investors in three aspects of board compensation policies: level of compensation, composition, and performance sensitivity. We differentiate pressure-sensitive directors (i.e., with business links) and pressure-resistant directors (i.e., without business links). Our results show that pressure-resistant directors decrease total board compensation and its fixed proportion, whereas they increase the variable proportion of total remuneration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. By contrast, pressure-sensitive directors offer the opposite results. These findings are consistent with the view that institutional investors are not a homogeneous group and that pressure-resistant directors fulfill a more thorough monitoring role."
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: BRQ Business Research Quarterly ; ISSN: 2340-9436 ; Volume: 18 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 161-173 ; Barcelona: Elsevier España
- Klassifikation
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Management
- Thema
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Corporate governance
Institutional investors
Board of directors
Remuneration
Compensation
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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López Iturriaga, Felix J.
García-Meca, Emma
Tejerina-Gaite, Fernando
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Elsevier España
- (wo)
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Barcelona
- (wann)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.1016/j.brq.2014.07.003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- López Iturriaga, Felix J.
- García-Meca, Emma
- Tejerina-Gaite, Fernando
- Elsevier España
Entstanden
- 2015