Artikel

Institutional directors and board compensation: Spanish evidence

We address the influence of directors who represent institutional investors in three aspects of board compensation policies: level of compensation, composition, and performance sensitivity. We differentiate pressure-sensitive directors (i.e., with business links) and pressure-resistant directors (i.e., without business links). Our results show that pressure-resistant directors decrease total board compensation and its fixed proportion, whereas they increase the variable proportion of total remuneration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. By contrast, pressure-sensitive directors offer the opposite results. These findings are consistent with the view that institutional investors are not a homogeneous group and that pressure-resistant directors fulfill a more thorough monitoring role."

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: BRQ Business Research Quarterly ; ISSN: 2340-9436 ; Volume: 18 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 161-173 ; Barcelona: Elsevier España

Klassifikation
Management
Thema
Corporate governance
Institutional investors
Board of directors
Remuneration
Compensation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
López Iturriaga, Felix J.
García-Meca, Emma
Tejerina-Gaite, Fernando
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Elsevier España
(wo)
Barcelona
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.brq.2014.07.003
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • López Iturriaga, Felix J.
  • García-Meca, Emma
  • Tejerina-Gaite, Fernando
  • Elsevier España

Entstanden

  • 2015

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